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 1
Introduction 
In the 21st century, most people have a home wireless network. The network is built 
around a gateway router connected to a provider network and can include access points, 
connected personal computers, mobile phones, and often autonomous appliances connected 
to Internet — Internet of things (IoT) devices. The IoT devices are usually relatively simple 
gadgets fulfilling a narrow function and exchanging data with a server in the cloud. These 
devices, in order to be produced cheaper and simpler, often lack security. This makes them a 
perfect target for a hacker attack. 
Network devices can be protected by a firewall, but it does not give an absolute guarantee 
against attacks, and the IoT devices can be infected in some way. In order to detect infected 
devices, some security-oriented routers have a feature for traffic anomaly detection. These 
routers observe the connected devices’ behaviour, and their algorithms determine the types of 
the devices by the traffic they produce. After that, they detect behavioural anomalies, raise 
alarms, and may react to prevent the possible intrusion. 
Anomaly detection, like any Intrusion Detection System (IDS), can produce errors: false 
positive or false negative results. In order to evaluate such feature implementation and to 
reduce the error rate, this function needs testing facility. 
This thesis is dedicated to the creation of a testbed which simulates connected device 
behaviour in order to test the IDS functionality in a security router. The security router 
tested in the created testbed will be called router under test (RUT). The typical use case of the 
testbed is to run an experiment with an IoT device connected to a security router, let the 
router identify the gadget, and afterwards modify a part of the traffic like a destination IP 
address and see how the router reacts. Ideally, the IoT device is used in the testbed only once 
— to record a traffic trace. Then, all the later operations are done by replaying the saved traffic 
traces with possible modifications. 
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More specifically, the thesis has the following goals: 
• Understand the requirements and methods for replaying network traffic in a test lab. 
• Design a testbed for security routers. Develop the process and tools working within that 
testbed that allows easy recording of the behaviour of an arbitrary IoT device, modify 
the trace, and replay it to a RUT. 
• Verify the created testbed produces the expected results on a real RUT and a real IoT 
device. This means that the RUT reacts to the replayed traffic in same manner as to the 
real IoT device. 
• Modify the recorded traffic trace in various ways and verify that the expected anomaly 
detection alerts are triggered. 
In order to achieve these goals, it was decided to design a testbench working with physical 
RUT and IoT devices. The testbench consists of a computer operating the test process and 
auxiliary network devices. The testbed application is implemented as a set of command-line 
applications. Various open source utilities and libraries were engaged to manipulate the 
recorded traces. The IoT device was simulated with a help of virtual device instances utilizing 
stored traces. 
The behaviour of an IoT device is identified by the network traffic it produces and is 
primarily stored as network traces. 
The testbed developed in this work was proved to be working by making a RUT identify 
simulation as a real device. It also triggered an anomaly alert after modifying the traffic. 
The rest of the thesis paper is organised as follows. Background chapter describes reasons 
for a project to be initiated, gives an overview on basic network technologies, surveys existing 
protection solutions and existing testbeds for them. Network traffic analysis chapter tells 
about theoretical approach to analyse the substance the testbed is working with. Testbench 
overview chapter describes basic principles of the project that has been implemented and 
the testbench itself from a perspective of a person operating it. Upper level implementation 
describes software architecture and tools used for the project. The next Protocol replay 
implementation chapter describes how particular network protocols replaying components 
work. The last Discussion chapter covers topics that raise doubts, project results, potential 
future work on the project and alternative solutions that could take place.
 2
Background 
This chapter considers some aspects and methods of network protection. It also overviews 
some of the existing tools with a similar purpose to the developed one in this work. 
2.1 Traffic traces 
A basic unit of traffic is a packet. World wide used TCP/IP protocols form a packet as a 
header section containing a protocol related service data, followed payload section with any 
information carried within the protocol. For example, a UDP header contains source and 
destination IP addresses and port numbers. A payload can contain another protocol data, 
thus one protocol wrapping another, creating a protocol stack. A TCP/IP model considers a 
stack of physical, link, transport and application layer. 
Most traffic can be divided into sessions — a series of packets related to each other, handling 
one process of a certain application. It can be tracked by particular protocol data-field, for 
example, transport layer protocol IP addresses and ports. IP address is used to refer to a host 
interface in a network. Typical transport protocols TCP and UDP have source and destination 
ports. Those are numbers that help OS to understand to which application received packet 
should be transferred. Clients usually generate a random port number for each session for 
themselves, where as servers port is fixed in order for client to know it, however, it is not 
mandatory. This way a session is defined by source IP address, source port, destination IP 
address and destination port. 
2.1.1 Recording 
Captured internet traffic is mostly stored in pcap files. The most famous utility for 
capturing traffic on Linux is tcpdump [1]. It is a command line tool that can just show a 
summary of a traffic or save the whole trace to a pcap file; allows to filter traffic, for instance 
by host IP; gives opportunity to select network interface to listen. There are also widely used 
applications with a friendly UI like Wireshark or Fiddler, allowing user to capture traffic, look 
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through parsed packets and save it. From low level perspective, there are numerous libraries 
allowing traffic sniffing. In this project scapy library was used for sniffing, along with packets 
modifying and sending. 
2.1.2 Replaying 
Whereas sending one packet into a network is simple — you can just use some library to 
utilize OS socket, replaying traffic through a network is complicated. Protocol data from the 
captured traces may differ from the state required by new network conditions. One of the first 
encountered problems was TCP/UDP destination port. The RUT tested in lab along with 
most home used routers uses network address translation (NAT) technology. NAT separates 
router’s LAN and WAN so that when a packet goes from LAN to WAN the original source 
IP address is changed to another IP address. The original purpose of NAT was to avoid IPv4 
network address exhaustion, since IPv4 protocol supports a limited amount of addresses equal 
to 232 in total excluding loopback, broadcast and other reserved addresses. The most widely 
used type of NAT is one-to-many NAT that is mapping all LAN addresses into a router 
WAN IP address. This NAT type supporting router stores the ongoing connections mapping 
from source address and source port number into a new source port. Source port number 
might remain the same, but can also be changed, for example to avoid collisions of same 
source ports from different LAN hosts. Port changing depends on a particular router software 
implementation making the port mapping impossible to predict for a general case. These port 
numbers should be consistent throughout a session replay. Other typical packet parameters 
that need careful consideration, when replaying traffic, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
2.2 Reasons and motivation for home network protec- 
tion 
An IoT device is often done simple (relieved from directly unnecessary features) and lacks 
security making it an easy prey for a hacker. And adversaries do actively seek a way to take 
control of it [2]. 
Security routers are being developed in order to protect home network devices. Some of 
them have a feature of traffic anomaly detection, that detects device abnormal behaviour. It 
might be questioned at this point, why we assume a device to be infected instead of improving 
protections that would prevent the infection in the first place. There are many ways to infect 
a device. Protecting it from outbound connection is not enough because an attack can come 
from inside the home network, from malware installed in a PC for example. Isolating an IoT 
device from any other devices will not work if an attacker acts physically and installs malware 
to a device manually. After all, a device may have malware ever since it has been produced! 
That is why it is important to make the assumption that no protection can work absolutely as 
the first line of defence and the device can be infected. 
A common security question arises, what motivates the adversary to attack. Most hackers 
are not concerned with a regular person’s bedroom temperature. The reason why he would 
like to control someone’s thermostat is probably to make it join his botnet. A botnet is a 
group of infected end-hosts under the command of a bot-master [3]. According to [2], an
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overwhelming majority of bots are IoT devices. Bots can be used for computational power 
(for example for cryptocurrency mining), or as source of attack to other systems. 
There are several possible reasons for an ordinary person to try to protect his IoT devices. 
One of them is the home network being flooded due to an intensive DDoS attack [2], slowing 
down the internet connection, or even disrupting device from functioning normally. Intensive 
use of device computational power can lead to a significant increase of electricity consumption. 
Another reason to protect oneself is possibility of a gadget spoiling one’s life in its way. This 
can happen while being either under personal attack by ill-wisher, or a person is just a victim 
of a mass attack causing thermostats to raise the indicator data so that a lot of people catch 
cold, in order to flood hospitals or paralyze society. A DDoS attack launched from home, 
might cause the IP address to be blacklisted in a certain segment of Internet, as black lists of 
IP addresses exist and can be used by server providers[4]. 
2.3 IoT devices attacks 
One possible way to infect an IoT device is to attempt to connect to it using default 
vendor default credentials via SSH[5], which are often neglected to be changed by users. 
Vulnerability is widely introduced utilizing telnet protocols for remote administration of 
devices[5]. Yet again attackers scan network for those devices and attempt to brute force 
credentials. Backdoors left by vendors or malware is another point to tempt an attacker. 
To try to connect to an IoT, malware should know the host address and an SSH port. 
To find that out port scanning is performed. For example, for TCP protocol it can be an 
attempt to start TCP three-way handshake. If the host exists at the tried address and there 
is an application listening to the port, it will answer with SYN-ACK packet on the scanner 
SYN message. If scanned address does not exist or port is not listened to, an ICMP message 
can be sent informing that destination is unreachable. 
Another way to hijack a device is using man in the middle (MITM) attack. MITM concept 
means intercepting communication between two instances and posing malicious intermediate 
system as original sender to both parties. This attacks can work against devices that do not 
have digital certificates that would authorize a server they are trying to access. For example, 
when IoT device tries to update software, MITM can spoof the updates to ones containing 
malware thus taking over control of a device. 
2.4 Firewall 
The first line of defence in a network is a firewall. Basic function of a firewall is filtering 
packets to go through it based on defined rules. This basic feature can prevent attackers from 
scanning or connecting to devices in your network. 
2.4.1 Packet filtering 
Firewall rules can be applied to a certain connection direction (inbound or outbound 
connections) and are determined with connection 5-tuple: source host IP address (also possible
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to put a subnet range), source port, destination IP address, destination port and protocol used. 
Also other transport layer header parameters can be potentially used. 
It is usually a good idea (unless you have hosts serving external clients) to forbid all inbound 
(incoming from outside) connections for your home network to prevent adversaries from 
scanning your network or connecting to your devices. Filtering outbound connections should 
be done carefully to allow connected devices function normally. Usually, certain applications 
use certain transport layer ports. There are hundreds of applications utilising different ports, 
the most commonly used protocols and ports are the described further: HTTP and HTTPS 
use TCP ports 80 and 443; SSH used for secure connection to a host usually uses TCP port 
22; Ports 20 and 21 are used for FTP; SMTP utilises port 25. It should be kept in mind that 
these are just conventional port usages, nothing prevents a server application from listening 
to a different port. It makes sense to filter outbound traffic based on those services usage, for 
example it would be very suspicious if an IoT device connects somewhere by SSH. Ports 80 or 
443, however are typically used by all devices. 
Firewalls simple setup and properly defined rules would protect a LAN from attacks by 
forbidding connections to your devices from outside and blocking certain protocols. An 
example of a protocol that can be blocked is IRC (typical way to send commands from bot- 
master) using ports 6666-6669 [3]. Firewalls can also stop malware scanning the network for 
vulnerable IoT devices [6]. 
2.4.2 Stateful packet filtering 
Stateful packet filtering is a technology improving the basic packet filtering. It ensures 
that the packet flow corresponds to a specified protocol. The first packet of session is checked 
against firewall rules and a session is cached. All subsequent packets of the session are checked 
against the saved cache [7]. After final packet is received by the firewall, no more packets for 
this session are allowed to go through. This boosts performance and mitigates the simple 
NAT breach. The problem of stateless NAT is that is does not know when a session has ended 
and keeps the port mapping alive for a certain timeout. This allows incoming packets with 
corresponding ports to go through for some while. 
2.4.3 Deep packet inspection 
Not only the transport layer is considered by firewall. A new generation of firewalls is being 
developed capable of dealing advanced threats [8]. With deep packet inspections (DPI) the 
firewalls can be capable of Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), Virtual Private Network (VPN), 
Anti-Spam, Anti-Virus and URL Filtering while optimising performance and throughput. 
Pattern or signature matching is the primary approach used firewalls with IDS features. 
This function analyzes each packet against a database of known network attacks [9]. This 
is a very difficult problem, because network activity requires a high performance, where as 
function implementation needs to check data against a very large signature database. DPI 
algorithms include regular expression matching, string matching algorithms, Wu-Manber 
algorithm, SBOM and others. DPI can be classified as signature based, application layer based 
and behaviour based identification.
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2.4.4 Firewall problems 
In past decade significant increase of https usage for transmitting web data is observed. 
Encrypted connections make DPI impossible. From firewall perspective it can have two 
solutions: forbidding https connections or serving as a proxy server to decrypt and reencrypt 
connection [10] using own certificates. From user perspective, using insecure connection is 
unacceptable in most cases like online banking or even social network usage, since it exposes 
everything: passwords, tokens, personal information. 
Stateful packet inspection cannot work properly with mobile devices changing their 
networks. Since connection interruption can happen at any moment without a warning, the 
NAT port remains open allowing an attacker to continue the session. Firewall should also 
have an improved implementation for protocols like Multipath TCP multipath-tcp-old 
DPI approach is comparatively very expensive — it requires a large computational power, 
is much slower a simple firewall significantly reducing network gateway throughput. 
Overall, it may happen that an adversary slips past the firewall via allowed connections, 
through an encrypted tunnel or simply infects a device in some other way. The internal 
network usually does not have restrictions, and thus one exposed device can infect the others 
via network. That is where intrusion detection systems (IDS) can be useful. 
2.5 Intrusion detection system 
Another protection method that can be used is monitoring the network, remembering 
the devices’ behaviour and taking precautions (like informing a user or banning the device) 
when a certain device behaves in a way it is not expected to. In a home network this work can 
be done by a security router with an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) feature that is going to 
be tested in this work. 
Classifying traffic as malicious can rely on deep packet inspection or monitoring the traffic 
properties. A signature or rule based approach works for known attacks. A machine learning 
approach allows an IDS to be more flexible and detect anomalies not caught by the previous 
approaches. 
There are two approaches for intrusion detection: network based and host based IDS. 
Network based IDS dynamically scans network traffic checking for anomalies or comparing 
against malicious signatures database. Host based IDS are installed on the machines directly. 
The latter tools monitor system state for left backdoors, certain segments of memory changes, 
network-based logs. This work focuses on network based IDS. 
2.6 Intermediate access device 
Another approach to protect vulnerable IoT devices is to connect them to a well protected 
computer[11] rather than directly to the home network. This will ensure that the devices 
can be directly accessed only after a strong authentication process. Such an approach will 
limit attack surface only to existing outgoing connections from those devices by man in the 
middle method. However, this method makes sense if those device are actually meant to be 
accessed from anywhere in internet, so it should be applied to certain subset of IoT devices.
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There are IoT devices that are not suitable for this approach. Those maintain a permanent 
live connection to its manufacturer servers and are meant to be accessed from there. However 
that kind of devices should have certificates set in order to be safe from man in the middle 
attacks. 
Other intermediate devices are called smart hubs. Those are produced industrially but 
position themselves based on comfort rather than security, although security is one of the 
primary aspects of those products. The basic concept is to connect all IoT devices to one device 
that controls them, so that user uses just one “simple” application to set up his smart house. 
There are several possible ways to connect IoT devices to a smart hub including Bluetooth LE, 
Wi-Fi, Z-Wave and ZigBee. Smart Home and City are examples of such products [12]. IoT 
devices and smart hubs utilize strong identity mechanism to authorize each other. 
2.7 Testing network equipment 
There are many aspects of network equipment that can be tested. One aspect is physical 
properties of a device. Users are primarily interested by a device bandwidth — maximum 
speed of data transfer, other properties include power efficiency or signal quality [13]. Another 
aspect for a security router is functional testing — how well it fulfills a security check without 
a stress load. 
There are many ways to organise development: agile, continuous, spiral, waterfall and 
other methodologies. But in any development process testing is a crucial step and required 
for a successful release. Test automation in a pipeline is a clue to ensure successful continuous 
delivery of a product. 
Testing can happen on different levels: unit tests check a simple component’s work; 
integration tests check connected components mutual work; acceptance or end-to-end testing 
checks if a whole system is capable of handling a use case. The work described in this paper 
was about end-to-end testing a security router. 
From a system awareness perspective, testing can be categorized as white, black and grey 
box testing. For a white box testing [14], tester should know how the tested code works in 
order to create tests covering all execution statements or paths. It is usually applied in a lower 
test levels (unit, integration). Black box approach means that testers don’t know how the 
tested unit is working. In this case test plan is created based on functional requirements and 
needs to cover test cases. Grey box testing is a hybrid one between previous two. In my work 
a black box testing was performed, as my knowledge about the router was mostly limited to 
communication and data extraction ways. 
For the work done on the described project, there are two important test case sets. First 
one is to modify traffic in such a way that it represents actually abnormal behaviour, so that we 
are expecting the RUT to trigger an alert. Another case is to test possible false positive anomaly 
detection. This can happen if the IoT cloud service changes its IP address, for example. 
2.8 Similar existing solutions overview 
Numerous tools for testing network devices exist focusing on different purposes. To my 
knowledge, none of them were aiming to simulate a particular device behaviour. However,
 2.8. SIMILAR EXISTING SOLUTIONS OVERVIEW 17 
those tools have a number of good practices to learn. 
2.8.1 Tcpreplay 
A good tool to send traffic from pcap files through a device interfaces is tcpreplay [15]. This 
program is working at network layer 2, sending the packages from a file one by one with a 
user defined speed. 
In addition to tcpreplay , there is a tool tcprewrite that allows to change MAC addresses, IP 
addresses and ports in pcap files and also other parameters. 
This tool is very deterministic, but the problem is that it is static. In a general case one 
cannot predict NAT port translation by a router under test thus RUT can have a different 
NAT port mapping than in the trace. Lost packets for TCP is another case where this tool 
would work incorrectly because the RUT may drop different packets than the original router 
did, and tcpreplay does not consider the current simply replaying packets from orignial trace 
as is. 
2.8.2 Stateful traffic replay for web application proxies 
This article[10] reviews several existing solutions and approaches and offers a new one for 
testing a non-transparent security proxy. The key goal of the tool described is to precisely 
reconstruct the application layer payload. 
The possible target of benchmarking by the tool is a web application firewall (WAF). WAF 
does deep packet inspection searching for possible attacks, for example, cross-site-scripting 
for web pages, or viruses hidden in downloaded files. However, deep packet inspection is 
not possible on encrypted traffic. That is why advanced security gateways dealing with this 
problem work as non-transparent proxy servers decrypting the flow and encrypting it when 
transferring data further. Here is where the described tool comes into business in this article. 
The work focuses on protocol modifications to a suit proxy, functional behaviour to suit 
different types of non-transparent proxy devices, maintaining concurrent connections, and 
making connections resistant to network like packets lost, packets out-of-order etc. Memory 
efficiency was one of the targets of this project, memory pool used by the tool has a limited 
size, and replayed data is loaded not exceeding it. The work also handles DNS requests to be 
correct by emulating the DNS server for the device under test. 
In order to save resources, the system reads the proxy’s response to understand whether 
the connection needs to be maintained on each side (LAN and WAN) of the network. For 
concurrent mode, the presented tool keeps the original order of replayed sessions, but the 
packet timing is left undetermined. 
2.8.3 Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Agency stateful 
TCP replay 
The work[16] is dedicated to creating a tool for stress testing WAN by loading it with a 
stateful TCP replay. This tool is aimed to make the tests repeatable. The work focuses on 
TCP and testing WAN traffic optimisation.
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The tool in this work acts in a server-client manner. It is able to modify a trace to fit the 
test environment and maintain inter-packet timing intervals. 
The program implemented for that theses consists of two parts: preparation and replaying. 
The preparing module parses a pcap file into a database, removes repeating packets and defines 
the timing. The second module is responsible for listening to incoming packets and sending 
those belonging to the corresponding host along with keeping the timing. 
The program is designed to keep the time intervals between packets. However, the timing 
would not be accurate in case of concurrent flows in both directions, due to a constraint that 
an expected packet in order will not be sent until the previous one has arrived. 
The machines used for running tests are set up to drop incoming packets for the cor- 
responding TCP sessions in order to force the OS to ignore them not to interfere into the 
replaying process. 
This work also provides methods for comparison between original and replayed trace. 
2.8.4 TCPopera 
Another tool for replaying traffic statefully is TCPopera [17] which aims to maximize the 
preciseness of TCP traffic replay. It has a mixed analytic model-based and trace-based approach. 
The timing and packet properties are processed into a model, where as the traces contents is 
replayed as is. 
This tool has the following objectives: no ghost packet generation, different traffic models 
support, inter-connection dependency, scalability and extensibility. The last objective means 
that TCPopera should have a possibility to be deployed in large test environments, with 
different models and protocol implementations, environment transformations and provide a 
possibility to install the tool to any arbitrary network. 
TCPopera has two phases: preprocessing traces and replaying traffic. During preprocessing 
the tool extracts traffic parameters, network configuration and data flows. A user can then 
change those. The main components of TCPopera are Flow Preprocessing, IP Flow Prepro- 
cessing, TCP Timer, TCP Control, Packet Injection, Packet Capturing. 
Inter-connection dependencies are supported only within one IP flow. It is done by 
keeping the order of packets for communication between two hosts. 
Packets are sent via the Packet Injection component through TCPopera nodes to a partic- 
ular virtual address. 
2.8.5 Comparison. Feature mapping 
Table 7.1 contains comparison for the described tools for a list of features.
 3
Network traffic analysis 
Replaying traffic is not as straightforward as simply sending packets from original trace 
because of dynamics and difference in network devices. This can affect different protocols in 
different ways and requires to be considered for the tool. Another situation to consider is 
that traffic undetermined dynamics not only affects certain packets directly, but also cascades 
to parameters of dependent traffic. 
3.1 Protocol sessions 
IoT traffic can be represented by various protocols including but not limited to DHCP, 
ARP, IP, ICMP, TCP, UDP [18]. A trace related to a protocol session can be characterized by 
• the participating hosts 
• the protocol header information 
• the packet order 
• the packet contents: the data itself and how it is distributed over packets 
• the packet timing 
Depending on a test-bench goals, each of these characteristics can cause challenges for a 
replay tool. For example, for network load testing, the timing and contents size are important; 
for deep packet inspection security devices, packet contents and order are important. In our 
case, the hosts turned out to be the most important feature to identify the acting device. 
Table 3.2 represents some of the remote hosts and protocols in the traffic produced by 
Arlo Camera. As can be seen from the table, TCP and UDP are mainly used as the transport 
protocols. 
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remote host address protocol additional info
broadcast DCHP Over UDP 
broadcast ARP
gateway ICMP echo (type 8 and 0) 
gateway DNS Over UDP, port 53, for time-a.netgear.com 
193.166.4.60 NTP Over UDP, port 123 
23.67.133.117 HTTP Over TCP, port 80 
52.31.233.143 HTTPS Over TCP, port 443 
ff02::16 ICMPv6 echo (type 8 and 0) 
broadcast ICMPv6 echo (type 8 and 0) 
209.249.181.91 NTP over UDP 
Table 3.2: traffic example started by the IoT device
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3.1.1 Hosts 
The participating hosts are always important traffic features, because the network at least 
needs to know where to send the packets. IP packets need to have a source and a destination 
IP address [19]. Ethernet headers of packets need to have a source and a destination MAC 
address. 
One of the tricky problems with replaying traffic is making the simulating instance MAC 
and IP addresses correspond to the ones used by the simulated device in the replayed trace. 
Obviously, there are two ways of doing it: setting the addresses of the simulating instances to 
match those in the trace, or changing the addresses in the replayed trace addresses to match 
those given to the simulating instances. 
For testing an intermediate device, the addresses of this device should also be taken into 
account along with other hosts working within the test-bench. 
A difficult technical problem arises when the IP address of one of these nodes is unknown 
in advance and allocated dynamically during the test. These cases will be considered later in 
the section 3.2. 
3.1.2 TCP and UDP ports 
Ports are the basic feature distinguishing sessions for these two transport protocols. A 
pair of IP address and a pair of TCP or UDP ports defines a session. When replaying traffic, 
a testbed must maintain these parameters coherently to that the sessions from the original 
trace and retained. 
However, the opacity of the intermediate device (router under test (RUT)) violates the 
original trace by changing this pair. For instance, a router with DHCP feature and NAT 
can change both the LAN side ports and addresses! So, when simulating TCP and UDP 
connections over such a device, it is important to change the destination port and address for 
traffic going towards a host in the local network to the one dynamically given by gateway. 
One potential way to do that is to know the ports in advance and change ports in the 
replayed traces, as it is done with Tcpreplay and Tcprewrite [15][20]. Another way is to do the 
mapping on the fly, after getting a response from RUT. The first case is impossible unless the 
router cooperates in such a way that the dynamic port is predicted correctly. In the second 
case, the replaying part is supposed to be more intelligent: remember the port given by the 
RUT and substitute the original port from the trace by it. 
3.1.3 TCP 
TCP takes a significant part of most IoT traces [18]. This protocol is special for its handling 
of lost packets, which are replayed. As a result, a trace can contain duplicate packets, packets 
with a messed order, or missing packets. 
A TCP trace may be of two types: client-server communication, where a client sends 
requests and gets responses, which is easier to reproduce in a plausible way, or two-directional 
independent flows that is difficult to be divided into messages. The testbed should be able to 
refragment TCP flows, but it must not confuse the logical order of requests and responses. A 
client-server communication could be identified by the application-layer protocols that are
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architecturally designed to have request-response structure, such as HTTP usually operating 
at port 80. Another potential way is to check how data is sent within ACK packets. For 
instance, when a client does an http request it has some payload with request data. The server 
always replies with an empty ACK packet first to inform that request is received and then 
processes it and sends a reply. Whereas, in two directional flow, when the load is enhanced, in 
order to save network from numerous empty ACK packets, a “piggibacking” technique is used. 
In this scenario, a communication participant delays answering ACK packet, waits for data 
to send from its side and if there is, attaches the acknowledgment to the outgoing data frame. 
When replaying TCP packets, the order and content distribution over packets is important 
to test IDS because, in order to go through IDS unnoticed, an adversary can do the following 
tricks. One trick is to fragment the data flow into small pieces, so that each piece does not 
contain any malicious data by itself, causing an IDS that does not have flow reassembly to 
ignore those packets. For those IDS that do reassembly flow, an adversary can rearrange the 
packet order in such a way that there would be two or more parts, each of which can not be 
detected as malicious. The IDS needs to process and assemble other flows, and at some point, 
it might drop the flow started by the attacker. The attacker can wait for a certain amount of 
time for the IDS to flush the buffer and then send the next batch of his flow. This also implies 
the requirement for the testbed to have precise packet timing when replaying flows and the 
ability to add delays. 
IP packet fragmentation can also become a problem when replaying TCP. Adversaries can 
use this phenomenon to hide attacks, making session more difficult to reconstruct for IDS. 
In comparison with UDP, manipulating TCP is complicated. TCP includes the following 
fields: sequence number, acknowledgment number, multiple flags, window size, data offset 
and urgent pointer. Those fields are dependent on each other and on previous information 
sent by the communicating host. Violation of TCP packet structure can cause RUT to abolish 
a session and fail a test purpose. More information can be found in the book [21]. 
3.1.4 UDP 
The User datagram protocol (UDP) is significantly simpler than TCP. Like the previous 
protocol, it has source and destination port, payload length and checksum — these are the 
only fields that require consideration during replay. 
Due to the simplicity of the protocol and absence of any inter-packet dependencies, it is 
very straightforward to replay. However, as UDP does not have any sequence or acknowledg- 
ment number, it is uncertain if the application layer meant the packets to go in the particular 
order captured in a given trace. 
3.1.5 ICMP 
The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) plays an auxiliary role. It has dozens 
functions, defined by the type and code fields, many of which are deprecated by now. ICMP 
does not have ports, and when packets go through NAT, router maps incoming packets to 
LAN hosts differently in the way described below. 
The most well known example is the echo function triggered by the ping utility. It is used 
to check accessibility of a particular host via the IP network. Often, the purpose of using
 3.1. PROTOCOL SESSIONS 23 
it is just checking an internet connection. Field type is set to 8 for echo request and to 0 
for echo response messages. The ICMP ID field is used to map the incoming packet to the 
original LAN host and it also defines the session along with the participating hosts (similar 
to host-port pairs in TCP). The sequence number field is used to identify a packet in case of 
packet duplication or loss, which can be seen by skipping a sequential number. The field data 
is used for a message that needs to be echoed. Potentially, any of the last two fields could be 
used by an adversary to slip past IPS and transfer some data. 
Another important function is “Parameter Problem: Bad IP header” marked with ICMP 
type 12. NAT identifies the source host by parsing the header information from the ICMP 
packet payload. 
ICMP type 3 is used to notify the sender of a packet that the destination address is 
unreachable. Taking this into account could be used to terminate unfinished TCP or UDP 
sessions, thus optimising test the running time. In any case, the RUT may send such error 
message at times that differ from the original trace, and it may react to ICMP messages 
differently. 
3.1.6 Time to live 
IP protocol has time to live (TTL) field. It should also be considered, as this field can cause 
router to stop the flow from reaching the destination. This is actually a hop limit meaning 
the number of times the packet can be transferred from one router to another, preventing 
the packet from circulating indefinitely. The value of this field is decremented every time the 
packet is forwarded. If a router receives a packet with TTL equal to zero, it drops the packet 
(fig. 3.1). Omitting the original value this field may lead a replay test to produce incorrect 
results.
Client ServerTTL=2
TTL=1
TTL=0
TTL=0
Figure 3.1: Time to live
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3.1.7 Checksum and length 
The IP and transport layers have checksum and length fields that protect packets from 
errors. Since packets might be impossible to replay as is in the original trace, it is important 
to keep these fields correct to avoid packets from being dropped or processed in a wrong way. 
3.2 Inter-protocol dependencies 
In computer network, it is common for contents of one session to depend on contents of 
another. These dependencies can potentially be found in application layer, but it is not so 
easy to find out by looking at bare traces and hardly possible to enlist all such cases. What is 
more important to focus on is the network layer dependencies. Host addresses is the data 
most frequently affected by depended protocols and session. 
3.2.1 DHCP 
Dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) is used to provide an IP address to a host. 
Normally, the DHCP session happens when the host first connects to the access network, and 
all the later IP based sessions use the acquired IP address as source. However, it should be 
kept in mind, that this is not always the case — nothing prevents a host from changing its IP 
address. 
3.2.2 DNS 
A major technical problem is changing the simulated servers’ IP according to DNS re- 
sponses from gateway. 
There are two ways of dealing with this problem: reading the responses from DNS and 
changing IP addresses accordingly; or emulating DNS servers to provide the IP address from 
the trace or the one that we want actually to see. Both cases are not so simple to handle. 
For both cases, it needs to be determined that particular sessions are dependent on DNS 
request. The figure 3.2 shows an example of (most probably) related sessions from a trace 
captured from a real IoT device (Arlo camera). As can be seen at packet number 29, the IoT 
device is requesting the NTP server’s IP address through DNS request. Router replies with 
packet 33, and this address is used in packet 35. 
In the provided example, the NTP session follows the DNS request uninterrupted. How- 
ever, we can assume that there may be some unrelated packets in between. Based on this and 
many similar examples, we can derive an algorithm for searching for interconnected DNS 
sessions. For each DNS session, the IP address is extracted from the response. This address 
is searched for in the following sessions as the destination of packets sent by the IoT device. 
The first found session is linked to the latest corresponding DNS response. Caching the DNS 
results by the IoT device is another situation to consider, meaning that the same IP address is 
used for multiple sessions without making a DNS request again. We might want to apply the 
DNS dependency to all server addresses in the trace after the DNS request. 
For the first DNS solution number one — DNS monitoring, the IoT simulating device 
needs to send DNS request to RUT and extract the IP address from the response. Then, this
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Figure 3.2: Layer subsection schema 
IP address must be used in the following session linked to the DNS session. The crucial point 
here is not to forget to use the same IP address on the server side. 
In this solution, the complexity is in DNS replay logic and other service-discovery commu- 
nication (skipping the RUT) to set up the correct IP addresses. This has a significant impact 
on the testbed architecture. 
The DNS mocker solution takes all complexity away from the actual replay tool. The 
component emulating the DNS server is nicely set up separately, and its task is to extract the 
IP addresses wanted for the replayed trace and to inject them to the DNS responses. However, 
this solution cannot cover the RUT cached DNS results case, potentially causing the traffic 
replay test to fail. 
One important note is that, in traces observed during the described project, no DNS 
requests going from the tested router were found. This means that the router itself can cache 
domain data for very long far exceeding several tests period of time, and work as the DNS 
server by itself. This fact excludes the DNS mocking solution. 
3.2.3 ICMP relations 
A TCP replay process could be affected by ICMP errors [22]. Errors can be classified as 
soft and hard. Soft errors, like transient network failure, should be handled, whereas hard 
errors should cause a session to terminate. There are two issues to consider in replaying 
errors: reacting from client side, and sending an error from WAN side. This might require a 
complicated manipulation. 
For example, during an ongoing TCP session, a router in the middle suddenly cannot 
find the destination and sends an ICMP packet with host unreachable message, causing the 
client abort the session. First of all, it is important to keep the order of the packets, when 
replaying. Another problem is to link the TCP session with ICMP message in the saved trace.
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№ Layer Protocol Example
1 Link Ethernet
2 Network IP
3 Transport TCP
4 Application HTTP
Table 3.3: Network layers example 
The ICMP packet needs to be parsed to find out what headers it refers to. If hosts’ addresses 
in the replay are different from the original trace, they need to be changed accordingly in the 
ICMP payload as well. 
Another problem to consider is keeping the replay close to reality when replaying using 
TCP socket connection. One might not link ICMP and TCP session and terminate the latter 
with FIN and FIN ACK packets, what would not be correct in case server connection lost. 
3.2.4 Secure DNS 
DNSSEC is the protocol that allows DNS to be authenticated (digitally signed) but does 
not provide confidentiality. This means, that the IP address for the next session should be 
extracted like for a DNS session. The problem with DNSSEC is that the timestamps in the 
signed records in the trace may have expired. This can cause the RUT to block the expired 
resources during the replay. 
Another case to consider is the DNS over HTTPS. This technology helps to keep DNS 
requests confidential. Unless session is decrypted, there is no way to know exactly what 
domain name was requested and what IP address was transmitted. But actually, we don’t really 
need to know it and just replay traffic as is with the original remote IP address, because the 
RUT does not know the correct IP either. Indeed, DNS over https is designed to bypass the 
local DNS server and cahce in the local router. Thus it creates no particular problems in the 
replay. Besides, there is hardly a motivation for an IoT to hide its DNS requests, unless it is 
hacked. 
3.3 Network layers 
Open Systems Interconnection model (OSI) defines a stack of protocols to be used for a 
packet transmission. Each protocol puts its load on top of the previous one. This stack can be 
represented as layers (see table 3.3). 
Traffic can be replayed at a particular network layer, meaning that the corresponding 
software would be used to build the packet on top of it. 
If the lower layer is chosen to replay traffic at, the developer probably needs to take care 
of all the upper layers. The point is that the packet will go through fine at this particular 
segment but can be dropped or misinterpreted later. For instance, we have a setup of a router, 
host A in the router’s LAN and another host B connected to the routers WAN interface (any 
of them may be virtual) illustrated on figure 3.3. The router has a NAT hiding IP address of 
host A. The task is to replay a TCP flow between hosts A and B initiated by host A. Since
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it is a test over router reaction, the IP address of host B is determined by the original trace, 
whereas IP address of host A can be dynamically defined. 
If we try to replay it at the link layer, then we need to adjust the MAC addresses of all 
packets from the original trace to the addresses used by the replaying instances. For a packet 
sent by host A, we set the source MAC address of host A and destination address to routers 
MAC address. Then, we copy the upper layer payload as is from the original trace. It will 
work perfectly fine for the link host A – router. But when it comes to forwarding the packet 
from the router further to host B, it might turn out that the IP address of host A is different 
in reality from the one saved in the trace. So, we have to modify the source IP address of the 
packet to the one dynamically given. Then the packet (transport layer part) will reach host B. 
Now, when we replay the responding packet from host B, the source and destination MAC 
addresses are set to host B and the router respectively. The source IP address should be the 
same as in the trace, but the destination IP address should be set to the router’s one (marked 
as “IP 3” on figure 3.3). But this is not enough, the second packet can be dropped on router 
because it has the wrong destination TCP port — different from the one assigned by the NAT 
which does not correspond to the one in original trace.
A B
MAC 4
IP 4
MAC 1
IP 1
MAC 2
IP 2
MAC 3
IP 3
Address not to be considered
Address considered only when replaying at link layer
Address considered when replaying at link and transport layer
Figure 3.3: Layer subsection schema 
If the same traffic is replayed at the transport layer, the only thing we need to think about 
is the destination IP address of packets heading to host B. And we still need to parse the 
packet to find out the port that host B listens to. But those are defined during a setup — no 
parsing or packet payload modification is needed during the run-time. The rest is done by 
the native software or hardware of the hosts. 
The higher layer is used, the easier it is to replay traffic reliably, as shown above, but the 
less possibilities we have to imitate the original traffic. For example, if replaying at application 
the HTTP layer, it might not be possible to change the timing of the packets properly; if 
replaying the same traffic at the transport layer (TCP), it is not possible to change or maintain 
original order of packets for the purpose described in 3.1.3.
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3.4 Session order and dependencies 
The major cases are considered in 3.2. This section will present an abstract way to think 
about order of packets and synchronization of sessions. 
The protocol, for which replay implemented during this work (TCP, UDP, ICMP echo) 
have sessions. For TCP and UDP, a session is defined by the host-port pairs. ICMP echo 
sessions are defined by the identifier field. We cannot expect that every protocol has sessions. 
For instance, ICMP Destination Unreachable [23] is a single packet sent from a router. In 
the theory developed in this work such single packets along with any packet that cannot be 
identified as part of another session due to any reasons will be considered as a separate session. 
So, let us assume that we have an arbitrary tool that can process an original trace of 
recorded packets sequence T = ( r1, r2, . . . rn), where ri is i -th packet in the trace, into a sequence 
of P = ( p1,1 . . . pk , m . . . ). For a packet pk , m, k is a session number and m is its sequential number 
in that session. So a session is defined as si = ( pi ,1, . . . , pi , ki). And as a result we have a set of 
sessions S = { s1, . . . sm}. 
Each packet pi , j from S has a corresponding original packet in original trace T defined by 
the function O : P → T . Let us define a packet ri is earlier than packet rj if it appears earlier in 
the trace T and denote the comparison as ri < rj ⇔ i < j . We can also expand this designation 
to the packets in the processed trace set P as pi , j < pk , l ⇔ O ( pi , j) < O ( pk , l); and to the session set S 
so that one session is earlier than another if the its first packet is earlier : si < sj ⇔ pi ,1 < pj ,1. 
Let us define a session si aftercomes sj if si starts after sj terminates and denote: si ≫ sj ⇔ 
∀ k , l : sj , k < si , l. 
Simplifying the definitions above for sessions interdependencies would be useful to un- 
derstand the session picking algorithms. Expression s1 < s2 means that starting s2 requires s1 
to be started. Expression s2 ≫ s1 means that starting s2 requires s1 to be terminated. 
Let’s acknowledge three very simple facts that will help us to optimise session picking 
algorithm. 
Statement 1 : The relation earlier is transitive. 
Proof. Let s1 < s2 and s2 < s3. ⇒ s1,1 < s2,1 and s2,1 < s3,1 ⇒ O ( s1,1) < O ( s2,1) and O ( s2,1) < 
O ( s3,1). Since those comparisons are deducted to integers that are known to be transitive on 
comparison ⇒ O ( s1,1) < O ( s3,1) ⇒ s1 < s3. ■ 
Statement 2 : The relation aftercomes is transitive. 
Proof. Let’s denote the last packets for s1, s2 as s1, m and s2, n respectively. Let s2 ≫ s1 and 
s3 ≫ s2. ⇒ s3,1 s1, m < s2,1 and s2, n < s3,1. Since s2,1 < s2, n, s1, m < s3,1 ⇔ s3 ≫ s1. ■ 
Statement 3 : If one session aftercomes another, then the latter one is earlier than the first 
session. 
Proof. Let s1 ≫ s2 and s2, k be the last packet of s2 then, s1,1 > s2, k ⇒ s1,1 > s2,1 ⇔ s2 < s1. ■ 
During this work replay principles were worked out for sessions replay.
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3.4.1 One current replay flow 
If the tool is running no more than one session at a time, then the most straightforward 
way to replay the trace would be to sort sessions by the start time ascending. So, the order 
would be s1, s2, . . . , sm, where si < si +1. This states the first rule of replay. 
For this case, the first rule is enough to keep the order of interdependent sessions. 
3.4.2 Concurrent replay flow 
In reality, a device can have multiple sessions running at the same time, and it can be 
beneficial to be able to simulate this. The first idea would be the same as above: a session 
should start before the previous one does if si < si +1. 
The second replay rule is that session, if si aftercomes sj, si cannot be started until sj is not 
terminated. 
3.4.3 Concurrent implementation algorithm 
The first rule implementation guarantees that sessions start in the same order. The second 
rule guarantees that TCP will not start before DNS, or ICMP error is not sent before the TCP 
packet that caused it. 
However, concurrent implementation is not as simple as the rules it would follow. This 
section offers possible algorithms for implementing them. 
Separating functionality is usually a good idea to improve abstraction and maintainability. 
This paper will introduce two algorithms. One is for processing a session set (example in 
fig. 3.4) into graph structure (fig. 3.5). The other is for implementing the pipe giving out the 
sessions. The first algorithm has strict assumptions on trace sessions dependencies, which is 
not very likely to happen in real-life devices. That is why it is better to keep the processing 
and the sessions piping functions separated. In this work, only two events are considered: 
session start and session end. This is also not covering all cases possible. Both algorithms 
could be extended with more session dependency types. 
Both algorithms share denotation of sessions set S , dependencies graph G = ( S , E ), where 
the set E ⊂ S × S × T represents the dependency edges from one session to another of type 
t ∈ T The type is either start requirement or termination requirement. 
3.4.4 Dependencies build 
For this algorithm, we will use two types of dependencies T = { b , t } — b for “begin”, so that 
( s , q , b ) ∈ E means that q ∈ S requires s ∈ S to start first; and t for “terminate”, so that ( s , q , t ) ∈ E 
means that q ∈ S requires s ∈ S to terminate first. 
3.4.5 Dependency fulfilling 
The idea is to unlock sessions for replay on certain events after their dependencies are 
satisfied. An offered technical implementation is to remove the edges from the dependency 
graph. Let us consider an example where s3 ≫ s2 and s5 < s2. Termination of replaying s2
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Figure 3.5: Sessions requirements
Algorithm 1 Dependency Graph Building Algorithm
E ← {} 
for s ∈ S do 
for q ∈ S do 
if s ≫ q then 
add ( s , q , t ) to E 
else 
if q < s then 
add ( s , q , b ) to E 
end if 
end if 
end for 
end for
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should fire an event to remove the dependencies of s3 and s5 on s3. The dependency removal 
should also trigger the session pipe update. 
The dependency removing function is pretty simple but is difficult to for a proper pseudo- 
code description, and it has been omitted here. 
3.4.6 Session pipe algorithm 
The session pipe is a class that receives events of removing dependencies from the con- 
structed graph as those are satisfied and provides input to a queue for the new sessions to 
start. 
Piping the sessions is not a straightforward technical task. There should be a queue between 
the session-start giving process and the processes replaying sessions. Not every request for a 
session can be supplied due to dependency conflicts. Events triggering dependency removal 
can also trigger a new session ready to be started added, which has been added to the queue.
Algorithm 2 Session Get Pipe Function
function PushSessionsToQueue (set E , queue SessionQueue) 
for s ∈ S do 
if E does not contain ( x , s , y ) then 
SessionQueue.push( s ) 
end if 
end for 
end function

 4
Testbench overview 
The schema of a home network with a security router is shown in figure 4.1. The network 
contains one secure router as a gateway and other devices connected to it directly. The goal of 
this work is to simulate an arbitrary device from this network.
camera bridge
smart
lock
www
WAN network interface
LAN network interface
network wire
Router
Figure 4.1: Security router in a home network 
The purpose of the testbed is end to end testing of a router, thus requiring its physical 
presence. Hence, the workspace is a testbench with multiple devices on it operated by a human 
through an operating device (OD), which is a personal computer. The testbench also includes 
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a switch with a mirroring port and a gateway router that connects the whole system with the 
Internet. 
4.1 Workflow 
The testbed operation is separated into three independent phases: traffic capturing, traces 
processing and replaying them (fig. 4.2). Every phase produces an input for the next one.
Capture Preprocess Replay
pcap file
processed files
Storage
pcap file processed files
Command 
Line 
Console
output result
Figure 4.2: Testbed processes 
Separating the processes allows independent development, execution and optimisation 
of each phase. The only requirement is the format of the “pipe” parameters. However, the 
testbench was designed in such a way that every phase can be done within the lab with minimal 
changes to it when moving to the next step. 
4.1.1 Capturing 
First step to reach the set goals would be to capture actual traffic produced or triggered by 
a LAN IoT device and to save it for replaying later. An operating person should set testbench 
into the state shown in figure 4.3, make sure that RUT is up and running, prepare the IoT 
device at the testbench, connect the ethernet cable with from the mirroring port to the OD, 
launch the capturing process and then start the IoT device. The expected result is a pcap file 
saved on an OD. This file may contain some side effect or unrelated packets — those can be 
filtered in next phase. 
The process is launched in an OD terminal by a command that takes the following 
parameters: output path, defining the destination file; network interface to listen from; 
capturing timeout time, unset by default and working until the user interrupts the process; 
traffic filter as optional parameter. 
However, it is not necessary to use the developed testbench for getting network traces. 
Any pcap files captured or created outside the lab can be used for the later phases. 
4.1.2 Preprocessing 
This process transforms given pcap file into files that can be used by the replaytool. The 
resulting files are specific to the replay tool. They include data integrating the overall picture 
like session order and parameters, and each session separately. The session format varies and 
depends on the implementation of a particular protocol replaying component.
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Figure 4.3: Capture Traffic Scheme 
This phase is divided into two steps. The first one is the transformation of pcap file into 
the miscellaneous files prepared for replay tool. This is done by a command line script called 
preprocess . 
The resulting output can contain extra traffic that is not needed for the upcoming test. 
Another step thus is required to refine the data. A utility program was developed named 
adjust . It processes the output json files into similar ones but filtering unnecessary sessions 
and changing the IP addresses to a the desired ones. The resulting json files are named in same 
manner but using “input” prefix by default, meaning they are ready to be taken as input by the 
replaying tool. 
Session parameters like the participating hosts, ports or session order might have a need 
to be modified for the test purpose. After a second step of refinement, the data is filtered and 
it should be easy enough to find to modify the needed session parameters. 
This phase is usually done on OD, but it is not a requirement. It can be run on any 
computer with Linux OS outside the lab. 
4.1.3 Replaying 
Before starting the replay process, the operator should make sure that the network set up 
is correct and the preprocessed set of files information corresponds to it. For instance, the 
gateway IP address in the source files should match the RUT IP address. 
The replaying phase requires the operator to set the testbench in the state shown on figure 
4.4 by connecting network wires. The replay process is then started by a command line utility. 
The input is a main json file in the same directory as the set of preprocessed files and the 
simulated device MAC address.
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Figure 4.4: Replaying Traffic Scheme 
MAC address can be input directly as a hexadecimal code, or autogenerated by the used 
tools. An utility was also created to give pass a device name as a parameter instead of MAC 
address. It is handy if experiment is composite: at first you want RUT to identify you simulated 
device and then reuse it. For instance, the first time you run the test with the original trace. 
Then you manually modify the input by adding an extra session to simulate an anomaly and 
rerun experiment with the same device name corresponding to its original MAC address. 
All the information about the process is output to the terminal. In the end, a RUT specific 
utility checks for anomalies detected.
 5
Upper level implementation 
It was decided that a general purpose computer is used to control all the process. It will be 
referred to as the operating device (OD). Ubuntu 16.04 was chosen as the operation system for 
the OD because Linux-based operating systems allow easier manipulation of network settings 
and SSH access. Another device in the testbench is the router under test (RUT) itself. Other 
devices installed to the testbench will be described in the following sections as the need for 
them is introduced. 
Python 3.0 was chosen as the main development language because it is very simple, suits 
prototyping development, is runnable on all major operation systems and has a great number 
of libraries including those working with network packets. 
5.1 Traffic capturing setup 
5.1.1 What traffic needs to be captured 
We are interested in traffic flowing through the RUT. It contains incoming and outgoing 
packets from both sides of the RUT: LAN and WAN communications between an IoT device 
and a server. 
Mostly flows just go through the router, but it should be kept in mind that the router has 
a probability to drop packages going from both the LAN and WAN interfaces, or to block 
the connection entirely. Hence it would be beneficial to monitor both sides of the RUT in te 
network. 
5.1.2 Way of capturing 
In this work, a mirroring switch HP 1820 8G was used to obtain traffic from the real 
devices. This switch has one mirroring port where it duplicates all packets incoming to any 
other ports. In order to capture the traffic, we set up an Ethernet connection from that port 
to the OD and started a recording utility listening to the network interface. This way, traffic 
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can be captured by any device, which relieves the system from strict dependencies of specific 
recording software. 
In order to capture traffic on both sides of the RUT, HP 1820 8G was configured to have 
four of the ports on the LAN side aggregated to VLAN1 and three on the WAN side aggregated 
to VLAN2 . The eighth one is the mirroring port. As shown in figure 4.3, every device that 
has its traffic captured is connected to VLAN1 of intermediate switch before the router. The 
RUT LAN interface is connected to VLAN1 also. The RUT WAN interface is connected to 
the switch’s VLAN2 along with the whole-testbench network gateway. The mirroring switch 
is connected to the OD to record the trace. The switch is set up manually once and does not 
require manipulation except changing the wired connection depending on the testbench aims. 
Another issue to consider is the speed of the traffic. The HP 1820 8G Ethernet ports 
support 100 Mbps and 1000 Mbps speed. Hence, to be able to reflect all traffic to the mirroring 
port, the total traffic speed on all other ports must not exceed the speed on the mirroring one. 
To provide this condition, mirroring port speed was set to 1000 Mbps while the others ports 
to 100 Mbps. 
5.2 Replay Setup 
The idea of the replay setup is to have a simulated IoT device (client) and simulated remote 
hosts (servers) under control of the OD to run their communication through RUT. It was 
decided that both client and server instances will be running on the OD. 
The problem is that the servers IP address flowing through the RUT must be the same as 
in the original trace, meaning that RUT will send the packets into the outer internet as it 
would do in a typical setup. In order to take control of the simulated traffic, a controllable 
gateway router was introduced to the testbench. The one that was used had an the OpenWRT 
operating system. The replaying program sets its IP routes to redirect the server oriented 
traffic to the OD interface to which the server simulating instances are connected, without 
the RUT knowing anything about it. The connection setup is shown in figure 4.4. 
In the developed testbench, for the trace replaying, the OD requires two wired connections 
to the intermediate switch: one connected to VLAN1 and another to VLAN2. The LAN 
packets from the trace are to be played through VLAN1 connection and WAN packets 
through VLAN2. The schema is shown on figure 4.4. Naturally, the client simulating instance 
is connected to VLAN1 and the server simulating instances are connected to VLAN2. 
Another goal of the project was to capture alerts raised by the RUT. As the experiments 
were done on a specific RUT model, it was automated. The alerts are extracted from the RUT 
directly using a serial connection. This process is done in read-only way after finishing the 
simulation and affects neither traffic thoughput nor the RUT behaviour. 
5.3 Architecture 
5.3.1 Capturing 
Traffic capturing is done using the scapy library directly wrapping its method for reading 
incoming packets from selected interface and writing them to a pcap file.
 5.3. ARCHITECTURE 39 
5.3.2 Preprocessing 
Preprocess command cleans the pcap file from duplicated packets with the Linux editcap 
utility and transforms the pcap into an output.json file with all the sessions enlisted with their 
properties. Each session has a unique key identifying it and linking to its resources. Each 
session has a file with the contents from the traffic trace which are protocol specific and will be 
described in chapter 6. The auxiliary files are output_grouped.json and output_sorted_sessions.json 
to help the replay tool to load the sessions. The file names can be set to something different 
than “output”. A session is described primarily with the client and server IP address, session 
key and first packet time, and it can also can contain other information about the client and 
server ports, flow size and so on. 
5.3.3 Replay 
The replay design is to have abstract clients and servers communicating via the RUT. Each 
client and server is represented by a separate running instance of some class able to implement 
the replayed protocol. The OD had two Ethernet interfaces: an internal one referred to as eno1 
in this work and external one called enx . The first was connected to the RUT LAN (VLAN1 
of the intermediate switch) and the second one to RUT WAN (VLAN2). 
One of the greatest troubles encountered during the project was replaying traffic from 
a single machine to both router interfaces. When a client and a server working with it are 
on the same machine, the traffic is sent through the Loopback interface and does not go out 
the machine. Setting up routes or iptables did not help. That is why it was decided to place 
clients and servers on two different virtual machines (VM). Oracle VM VirtualBox was used 
for that purpose. The IoT dvice is represented by one VM with Jessi OS - the simplest Linux 
OS found. It utilized the eno1 interface as its own. Server instances were created on another 
VM with Ubuntu OS, which uses the enx interface (fig. 4.4).
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GatewayRUT
18. kill
19. kill
20. check for 
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Figure 5.1: Replaying Traffic Flow
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Vagrant is used to create the VM images during make build . It installs all the requirements 
on the VMs and sets up the connections for them. Vagrant is not required for each replay once 
the VMs have been created. VirtualBox provides a good command line interface for operating 
the existing images, which is utilized by the our testbed. 
Once the replay tool started, first of all, it reads the json files input to it, enlists the servers, 
connects via SSH to the gateway router and routes the server IP addresses to the enx interface. 
This is done is done by ip route command. The whole process is automatic. The tool knows 
from the configuration that the enx interface needs to be used, finds out its IP address and 
uses it in the gateway. 
Then the tool starts VMs, setting the MAC address of a client VM if required by the pro- 
gram input, uploads the chosen preprocessed files there by using a shared directory, connects 
to them via network interfaces, and runs the scripts start the servers and clients. The scripts 
running on the servers and clients are absolutely independent; the only link between those is 
the resource files created in preprocessing phase. 
For each server host, a virtual interface on the VM is created having the actual IP address 
from the trace. This way, traffic routing is done automatically to those interfaces on arrival 
from the gateway to the server VM. 
The servers are started all at once. Each protocol-host-port tuple is represented by one 
server instance. Each server is running as a separate process. Such a server loads all the 
information when started and listens to the corresponding interface (and port). When a 
connection comes to that listening socket, the server creates a new thread and answers the 
connection. The response depends on the server implementation. If the server has multiple 
sessions available for replay, it chooses the one corresponding to the requesting data and 
replies. 
The clients program is designed in a different way. The script takes the session order 
from the preprocessed files and then replays each session one by one sequentially starting a 
new client instance for each session only after the previous client is terminated. Each client 
is running as a separate process also. In order to keep track on whether a client is done the 
termination events are put into a pipe. 
After the clients program is finished, it releases an SSH terminal letting the root replay 
process on the OD know that the replay has finished. Then the replay tool turns off the VM 
and starts reading information from the RUT to report its reaction to the operator.
 6
Protocol replay 
implementation 
The components responsible for replaying certain network protocols are independent 
from the rest architecture and can be developed separately. 
6.1 DHCP 
Since the simulation happens on virtual machines, the OS handles the IP address as- 
signment by itself. Thus, the developed testbed does not need to deal with the address 
configuration. 
6.2 TCP 
6.2.1 Preprocessing 
The preprocessing phase utilizes the Linux tool tcpflow to extract traffic and tstat to get 
session parameters. The result of tcpflow is two files containing binary flows from the client 
to server and the other way around. These files are used as the source of data for TCP replay. 
The tstat tool extracts information about complete and incomplete TCP sessions into text 
files represented as tables. The testbed code parses those statistics files and translates the 
required information into output JSON files. 
6.2.2 Replaying 
The exact replaying of TCP is a difficult task with the original timing and fragmentation. 
Therefore, the TCP replay is done in such a way that the client sends the whole flow to a 
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server and the server sends back the whole flow as response. After that, the communication is 
terminated. 
Both the client and server utilise native OS sockets for sending information to relieve 
the program from tracking ports and IP addresses and the TCP logic. This means that the 
software is build on top of network transport layer.
TCP Server Process
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connection event
Listen to
network
interface-port
Start replay
Sessions
request1 - response1
request2 - response2
request3 - response3
network
socket
Compare request,
Select response Send response
Figure 6.1: Replaying Traffic Flow 
Often a server with the same IP addresses is engaged in several sessions in the original 
trace. All of these sessions are loaded to the replaying server. If the TCP server has multiple 
sessions, it compares the incoming flow against them and picks the session with the same 
client flow (fig. 6.1). If such a session is not found, the server picks the session corresponding 
to the current counter, which increases with each incoming connection. If the counter exceeds 
number of sessions, it is set back to zero. 
6.3 UDP 
6.3.1 Preprocessing 
Just as TCP preprocessing, UDP preprocessing utilizes tstat and processes the traces in a 
similar way. The sessions are extracted within the developed tool, by selecting UDP packets 
from the preprocessed pcap file by the participating hosts and ports with the help of python 
scapy library.
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6.3.2 Replaying 
The client (fig. 6.2) utilises native OS sockets for sending the packets, working on top 
of transport layer. The program listens for packets from a specific source host and port. It 
uses scapy library to extract data from the pcap file and packets it contains. The client has a 
queue of incoming and outgoing packets for each session. If the current packet is supposed to 
outgoing for this client, the tool sends it to the defined receiver. If the packet is incoming, the 
tool listens to the connection within a certain timeout. If the expected packet does not arrive, 
the next packet is taken from the queue. When the queue is empty, the client terminates.
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Figure 6.2: Replaying Traffic Flow 
The server (fig. 6.3) is implemented in a similar way to TCP. It has a bunch of sessions 
related to it and listens to the socket corresponding to the correct interface and port. Once 
the socket gets a packet, the server selects a session for it. Then it creates a client (exactly the 
same as described above) in a separate thread and gives the selected session as queue. 
6.4 ICMP echo 
6.4.1 Preprocessing 
Preprocessing is done using the scapy library. A session is identified by the echo destination 
IP address and the ICMP id field. The sessions are saved as pcap files containing the filtered 
packets. 
6.4.2 Replaying 
First of all, automatic echo is blocked on the OS level to ensure that the testbed controls 
which packets are replied.
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Figure 6.3: Replaying Traffic Flow 
The server is determined only by the host IP address. 
The client is implemented in a similar manner as UDP. The server, however, is very 
different (fig. 6.4). It does not create a separate thread for an incoming packet. Instead, it just 
picks a response by ICMP sequence number from a stored session. If the ICMP server does 
not find a corresponding request and response in stored the sessions, it echoes in the regular 
way. Both the client and server are utilising the scapy library to send the packets.
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 7
Discussion and framework 
analysis 
This chapter reviews the system for possible alternative solutions, ways of improvement 
and comparison with other tools. Test results are also introduced here. 
7.1 Device identification 
The simplest way to identify a particular device is by its MAC address. So, a security 
router can learn what an IoT device under certain MAC address does in the network for some 
period. If this device starts operating in a way it never did before, the security router takes 
actions regarding the device. 
At this point a doubt may appear if it is a good way to identify devices by their MAC 
addresses. Generally, the MAC address on an interface can be changed, unless the device OS 
or hardware disallows sockets that work at the link layer to overwrite the MAC address of 
the interface. This means that malware installed on an IoT device can use a different MAC 
address when networking. The counter argument measure from the security router could be 
forbidding new devices (identified by the MAC address) from connecting to the network 
without a user permission. However, it is common for many devices to use the ARP protocol. 
For example, this could be used to scan the network and to mimic another device using its 
MAC address. Preferably, the address would be spoofed for a PC that has complex behaviour 
from which it is difficult to detect anomalies. But the detection of anomalous device behaviour 
is out of the scope of this work. 
7.2 Testbench setup 
The capturing setup does not actually require a controlled gateway between the RUT 
and the outer network, along with the serial connection to RUT. The replaying setup does 
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not require a mirroring switch because the OD LAN connection can go directly to the RUT. 
The server instances interface can go directly to the gateway router. Nevertheless, those 
devices were introduced in the architecture shown in figures 4.3 and 4.4 because installing 
and uninstalling devices would be unnecessarily time consuming for the operator. 
With those devices untouched, the difference between the testbench states is the wired 
connection going from the OD enx0 interface to VLAN2 instead of the mirroring port, not to 
mention the actual IoT device connected. 
7.3 Experiments and results 
The experiments for each step were executed using real IoT devices and a real RUT. 
7.3.1 Capture 
Traffic capturing was dispatched many times during the work on the project. It included 
traces from a personal computer, Arlo camera and Philips Hue smart light hub. Due to the 
ability of the tool to filter traffic, clean traces for IoT devices were saved to the OD hard drive 
as pcap files. The only anomaly caused by the mirroring switch was duplicating every packet 
in the files. However, this did not cause any trouble and can be eliminated with tools like 
editcap . 
The traffic for the Arlo camera IoT device is described by the sample given in table 3.2. 
Overall, the camera uses HTTP and HTTPS to exchange data with its services, NTP for clock 
synchronization, and DNS for IP address discovery. This device was identified by the RUT 
during the traffic capture phase. 
The Philips Hue hub also uses NTP, DNS, along with HTTP for communicating with 
Philips servers. In contrast to the Arlo camera, it uses the SSDP protocol (over UDP), and 
the most important difference was the smart lamp communicating with another local device 
(probably a mobile phone changing the light parameters) via TCP. This device was not 
identified by the RUT during the capture step. 
A set of certain curl calls also triggered the RUT to identify the traffic source device as a 
fake smart lock for testing purposes. These traces including DNS and HTTP calls were also 
captured and saved. 
7.3.2 Replay 
The replay tool was used for all of the three cases described above. To keep the tests clean, 
each experiment happened with new MAC addresses given to the IoT simulating device. 
The fake smart lock and the Arlo camera replayed traces triggered device identification in 
the RUT with the right device types for the corresponding MAC addresses. The smart lamp 
was not identified, however.
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Tcpreplay web proxies Marine TCPopera Our tool
Works through 
opaque proxy server
no yes no no no
Stateful / Network 
anomaly resistent
no yes yes yes yes
Packet time can be 
considered
yes no yes approximately no
Resources optimisa- 
tion
- yes yes yes no
Protocols replayed all TCP TCP TCP TCP, UDP, 
some ICMP
DNS dependency 
handling
no yes no no no
Table 7.1: Comparison with the similar replay tools 
7.3.3 Anomaly 
After the items were identified as IoT devices, unrelated traces were replayed on their 
MAC addresses. This triggered the RUT to alert about anomalies happening for those MAC 
addresses. 
7.4 Comparison with other tools 
The tool developed in this project is capable of testing routers with NAT. The tool supports 
multiple protocols and is extendable to more protocols. The summary of the capabilities, is 
shown in the comparison table 7.1 
However, due to an extendable architecture with independent components, features like 
packet time keeping can be added, optimisations can be improved and the protocol list can 
be extended. 
7.5 Future work 
During this project a prototype that proved working was built. However, having more 
experience and given more time, there is has a vast space to extend and improve. 
7.5.1 Wireless challenges 
The mirroring switch alone is useless to capture traffic from a device that is connected 
to a router via Wi-Fi. In order to do that, either an intermediate access point or a wireless 
sniffer device would be required to capture radio signals. The latter would have problems if 
the radio is encrypted.
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The same problem may potentially occur with replaying if a router expects a certain device 
type to be connected via Wi-Fi. This could also be solved by a wireless access point. 
7.5.2 Resource consumption 
As mentioned in chapter 6, the servers are loaded all at once. It allows the server VM to 
reply fast to any response, but makes it consume an unnecessary high amount of resources. 
Two improvements could be done. The easy one is to load sessions for a server only when it is 
required and to release the resource once the session is over. The more difficult one is to run 
the servers only when they are required. But the second solution would require very precise 
control of the ongoing processes, inter-OS pipes and non-trivial developer skills to ensure 
that connections are not dropped because the server is not ready. 
An interesting challenge can arise for concurrent session replay. If you want to load the 
replaying instances in advance, the sessions can be blocked by dependency rules (described 
in section 3.4), and we do not know which next session is going to be unlocked affected by 
the replay process due to an ongoing session termination or another event introduced by a 
potential testbed. 
7.5.3 Communication architecture 
The client-server design for a session does not always reflect the reality. It might have 
problems with broadcast or other protocols. For example, an ICMP network error message 
may go beyond this design. It is sent not by the main session server but from some router. 
Then, we have a client receiving packets from two hosts. 
The developed tool also does not support communication of multiple simulated devices 
in the RUT LAN, which is needed for the Philips Hue hub, for example. 
7.5.4 Experiment analyzing 
As mentioned in the experiment section, some of the devices going through the testbench 
may be unidentified. If the device type is identified while or after connecting it physically, but 
not identified when replaying it with the tool, a question arises why this happens. In order to 
be able to answer such questions more confidently, comparing the original and replayed traces 
would help. However, the tool developed in this project does not support saving the replay 
traffic, making it more difficult to analyze the replay step work and the results in general. 
7.5.5 Inter-protocol dependencies 
For this project, a TCP socket behaviour was not tested in the presence of ICMP error 
messages. According to the web discussion in [24], when receiving a fatal ICMP message, an OS 
TCP socket terminates automatically. However this may heavily depend on its implementation. 
Besides, UDP that is not stateful may react differently and requires a separate consideration. 
The IP address dependency on DNS was not implemented. Potentially important situation 
here is DNS caching by the RUT. Not only it can lead to intercepting a request to the DNS 
server, but also result into an IP address different from the replayed trace! The preferable
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implementation would be to parse the DNS response on the fly and set the corresponding IP 
address in the whole process accordingly. This would also require reconsidering loading all 
the system on the start and make it more dynamic. 
7.6 Testbench design alternatives 
During this project multiple alternative solutions on some aspects were considered. Some 
of them are not feasible, others were to difficult to implement. 
7.6.1 Ways of capturing traffic 
One way to capture all the traffic going through a controllable router in the network is to 
open a shell on the RUT to execute tcpdump or a similar utility, running an extra process 
there, relying on the device memory and capacity, which is not a very clean way of testing it. 
A cleaner way is to set transparent proxy devices around the RUT that captures the traffic. 
This does not affect the way RUT works but creates an overhead of complexity to control 
those devices. 
The mirroring switch described in 5.1.2 is the simplest and the most effective way of 
capturing traffic. 
7.6.2 Wired connections 
From the operator perspective, having on the desk up to eightwires going in every direction, 
making it impossible to bunch them, along with power cables and the keyboard and key mouse 
wires was a little bit annoying. It became difficult to maintain them in order and especially to 
assemble the testbench. 
As mentioned above, the switch is required only for capturing traffic. Removing it for 
replaying a device traffic, would reduce number of wires by three. 
One of the ideas for reducing number of wires was to use a trunk connection going from 
the OD to the switch interface for accessing both VLANs. Packets going through the trunk 
have an additional VLAN layer between the transport and link layers stating which network to 
go through. However, this idea was rejected due to routing difficulties when replaying through 
one network interface, and bringing more complexity to maintaining this layer structure for 
OS network sockets. 
7.6.3 Replaying instances 
For two network interfaces with arbitrary IP addresses, belonging to different subnets 
built around different routers but located in the same OS environment, when sending a packet 
from one to another, it did not go through those routers but directly through the local OS 
subnet instead. This fact the traffic from going through the RUT. The attempted solutions to 
overcome the problem included using Ubuntu route , iptables and bridge tools. But none of 
the configuration attempts were successful. Although potentially those utilities could have 
solved the problem, the network stack in a single OD host has not been designed to support
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robust forwarding of packets through suboptimal routes. Using virtual machines worked 
better becaus each VM has its own network stack, and it is the only solution for this problem 
presented in this work. 
Using virtual machines to keep the clients and the servers during replay phase was a 
working but costly solution causing a significant overhead in terms of the computer resources 
used, installation and loading time, and developed software complexity. It also potentially 
pollutes the replay, since the installed OS can have traffic of its own.
 8
Conclusion 
Many IoT devices are vulnerable and require additional protection that can be granted by 
a firewall, IPS or IDS. 
A framework replaying traffic is important for end-to-end testing of network security 
devices varying from simple firewalls to complex IDS. However, the same trace can be replayed 
in different manner, thus it is important to know what properties of the traffic are required 
to be maintained in replay process and the tool should be adjusted. 
For a consistent replay different traffic dependencies need to be considered, since data 
like a port or an address defined in one place can affect another place which is not connected 
session or protocol-wise. And this data can differ in the original and the replayed traffic. 
Traffic replay can happen at a different network layer. The choice of the layer should be 
done based on the replay purpose — what traffic characteristics described in section 3.1 are 
wanted to be preserved. The lower layer is picked, the more characteristics tool can maintain, 
but the more complicated software needs to be developed, which would actually duplicate the 
higher layers’ functionality. 
The testbed should have separate steps of capturing and replaying traces. Putting any 
intermediate trace modifying or preprocessing into a separate step simplifies software and 
saves time during replay step. 
The software developed in this project proved to be working on a real RUT and real traces. 
It is capable of capturing, modifying and replaying traffic. As a result of experiments, the 
virtual client instances simulating the real devices have been identified as the fake test smart 
lock and real Arlo camera. After adding unrelated traces into the existing traces, the RUT 
indicated anomalies in the traffic produced during the simulation of the identified devices. 
Since one of the project targets was replaying multiple network protocols, it is feasible to 
split the tool into independent components. The developed tool replays TCP, UDP and ICMP 
echos. But the list can be extended to other higher or lower layer protocols like Ethernet to 
cover more potential traffic or http to maintain application layer consistency. 
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